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The Case for State Pollution Taxes 
I. Why Pollution Taxes? 
Our present tax system primarily taxes functions that 
our society seeks to encourage: income, capital formation, 
payrolls, sales and property. Any tax places a burden on the 
function taxed, so the effect of these taxes is to depress in- 
come, employment and sales, discourage capital formulation 
and decrease property values. 
* Richard Ottinger was appointed Dean of Pace University School of Law 
in the Fall of 1994. Dean Ottinger came to Pace University when he retired 
from Congress in 1984. As a professor he taught in the environmental law pro- 
gram. As co-director of the Center for Environmental Legal Studies, he has 
been involved with students in pursuing a major utility reform program. In his 
sixteen years as a member of the House of Representatives, he authored a sub- 
stantial body of energy and environmental laws. He founded the Environment 
and Energy Study Conference, the largest bipartisan, bicameral caucus in Con- 
gress, and was one of the earliest environmentalists in Congress in 1965. As 
Chairman of the Energy Conservation and Power Subcommittee (Energy & 
Commerce Committee), he was instrumental in adopting such key statutes as 
the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act. Dean Ottinger was a founding staff 
member of the Peace Corps, serving it during 1961-1964. 
** William B. Moore is a graduate of Utah State University (B.S. Environ- 
mental Studies), UCLA (J.D. 1982) and Pace University (U.M. 1994)(Environ- 
mental Law). He is presently serving on the faculty of the University of Illinois 
School of Law teaching and conducting research in the areas of environmental 
and energy law. 
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Indeed, the distortionary effect of the existing tax system 
places an enormous burden on the United States economy in 
terms of lost business, work and savings. 
If considerable government revenues could be raised in 
non-distorting ways, allowing reductions in taxes on in- 
come, payroll and profits, the real economic savings would 
be huge. . . . substituting $100 billion of non-distorting 
taxes for a mix of current federal taxes yielding the same 
revenue might easily generate $40 to $60 billion yearly in 
additional real income. This potential-tax reform dividend 
is as large as the much-heralded peace dividend.l 
It is much sounder social policy to tax functions society 
wishes to discourage than those which it seeks to encourage. 
Hence, increasing attention is being focused, particularly in 
Europe and Japan and in international forums, on taxing pol- 
lution. In the United States, there has been a tendency on 
the part of governmental entities in recent years to impose 
"sin taxes" as excises on activities society wishes to  discour- 
age, most prominently the sale of tobacco products, liquor, 
guns and the like. A pollution tax can be considered a type of 
"sin tax.yy2 
Pollution taxes are also a sound environmental, instru- 
ment. The principal means of controlling pollution in the 
United States is by command and control regulation, setting 
standards or limits on emissions and requiring particular pol- 
lution control technologies.3 Command and control regula- 
tion of pollution, while necessary to assure pollution 
reductions, has its limits. While much more certain of reduc- 
ing pollution than pollution taxes would be, controls tend to  
be set only at levels that are politically acceptable. Seldom 
are the full social costs of pollution eliminated in pollution 
control standards, except where particularly noxious prod- 
ucts are banned outright, such as the prohibitions against 
1. ROBERT REPETTO m AZ.., WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, GREEN FEES: 
How A TAX SHIFT CAN WORK FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY 4 (Nov. 
1992). 
2. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 5701 (1992). 
3. P E R C W ~  m AZ.., ENVIRONMENTAZ. REGULATION 420 (1992). 
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use of asbestos, DDT and lead in gasoline in the United 
 state^.^ Furthermore, when standards are adopted, there is 
no incentive provided for emitters to exceed those standards 
or to develop better pollution control technologies. 
Pollution taxes burden activities society wants to dis- 
courage. They provide an incentive to create new environ- 
mental technologies and efficiencies to promote pollution 
prevention. They allow the affected polluters to react t o  the 
tax incentives in the most economically efficient manner, 
without prescribing particular control technologies, as many 
of the command and control regulations do. 
Pollution taxes conform to longstanding Pigouvian eco-' 
nomic theory that the polluter should pay for the damages 
caused to society by its pollution, and that the costs to  society 
from pollution should be incorporated into the polluter's 
prices. Thus, the market place can be used to promote manu- 
facture of less polluting products and to encourage use of less 
polluting processes. 
Pollution taxes promote efficiency improvements in in- 
dustry that can make the taxed manufacturers more competi- 
tive. They foster the development of new pollution 
prevention and control technologies which open up new busi- 
ness and job opportunities.5 They promote efficiencies in the 
use of energy which can lower energy bills, again fostering 
competitiveness. 
Furthermore, in a time of revenue stringency for all 
levels of government, pollution taxes create substantial reve- 
nues that can be used to balance budgets and for environ- 
mental purposes. This would alleviate the economic gross, 
sectoral and equity impacts of existing taxes. 
Our country is not without experience with pollution 
taxes. Most particularly, Congress adopted a tax on chlorin- 
ated fluorocarbons (CFCs) in 1990 to accelerate the phase-out 
- 
4. RICHARD ~ I N G E R  ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF ELECTRICITY 562 
(1990). 
5. k MILLER & C.A. MOORE, CENTER FOR GLOBAL CHANGE, UNIVERSITY OF 
MARYLAND AT COLLEGE PARK, GREEN GOLD - ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY 
AND THE RACE TO CAPTURE INDUSTRIAL DOMINANCE OF THE 2 1 s ~  CENTURY (Sept. 
1993). 
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of these stratospheric ozone depleting chemicals.6 The Clean 
Air Act also contains a number of fees for violation of stan- 
dards that are geared to pollutant emissions and act very 
similarly to pollution taxes. The Clean Air Act specifies that 
pollution taxes are one authorized means by which states can 
meet its air emission requirements.7 
11. Addressing Pollution Tax Problems 
A. Competitive Concerns 
Perhaps the chief concern about pollution taxes, as it is 
with other taxes, is that they may create a competitive disad- 
vantage for the affected taxpayers vis 6 vis competitors in 
other jurisdictions which impose no such taxes or impose 
them at lower rates. This concern applies to international 
trade at the federal level and to interstate competition at the 
state level. Pollution taxes can be offset by reductions in 
other taxes, however, to ameliorate their economic impacts. 
Competitive concerns about a revenue-neutral tax ex- 
change should be far less than concerns about a tax without 
offsets. Furthermore, the distortionary effects of taxes on in- 
come, capital and labor create much greater competitive dis- 
advantages than do taxes on pollution, which tend to promote 
domestic investment and labor. The switch f?om traditional 
taxes to pollution taxes should, therefore, create, on average, 
a competitive advantage to state enterprises. 
Finally, a recent study demonstrates that tighter pollu- 
tion requirements induce affected enterprises to  become more 
efficient, thus more competitive. The added efficiencies cre- 
ate new businesses to  manufacture the more efficient 
processes and pollution control devices, which in turn create 
new export business opportunities for the affected 
industries.8 
6. I.R.C. Q 4681 (1990). 
7. Clean Air Act § 101,42 U.S.C. § 7401 (West 1983). See J. Andrew Hoer- 
ner, New Clean Air Bill Directs States To Collect Environmental Taxes, 49 TAX 
NOTES 944 (1990). 
8. A Miller, supra note 5. 
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There will still be industrial sectors particularly im- 
pacted by pollution taxes. However this effect is not com- 
pletely undesirable. For example, since coal combustion is so 
intimately related with a variety of emissions, it is environ- 
mentally desirable to eliminate. Some of the sting can be al- 
leviated by using a portion of the tax revenues to assist 
manufacturers to  diversify and to retrain workers. Competi- 
tive concerns with respect to pollution taxes can also be par- 
tially addressed by taxing imports of the offending products 
and exempting exports from the tax. 
B. Tax Rate 
There are concerns deriving from the size of the tax. Ide- 
ally, the size of the tax should be high enough to prevent 
emissions at levels which cause damage to society, but this 
may be politically difficult to achieve. To the extent the taxes 
are high, there will be more competitive pressures with which 
to  deal. On the other hand, small taxes will have much 
smaller pollution-reducing effects.9 However, it is better to 
have a tax at a small level producing some pollution-reducing 
effects than to have no tax and thus no pollution reductions. 
Taxes can be phased higher over time as experience with 
them is gained. 
It should be noted that a much lower tax can produce the 
same environmental improvement if some of the revenues are 
used for pollution reduction. Thus, a New York study shows 
that a carbon stabilization target could be achieved at a sig- 
aificantly lower cost if the revenues were used solely for car- 
bon reductions, and that this use of revenues would also 
substantially offset the regressive effects of the tax.1° 
- 
9. CHRISTOPHER STONE, THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN 136-41 (Princeton 
U. Press 1993). 
10. Ajay K. Sanghi & Anthony L. Joseph, Taxing Pollution Instead of La- 
bor: Is it a Prudent COz Reduction Policy?, 6 ELECTRICITY J. 51 (Jan. - Feb. 
1993). See also, A. SANGHI ET AL., N.Y. STATE ENERGY OFFICE STATE LEVEL IM- 
PACTS OF A FEDERAL CARBON TAX: A NEW YORK STATE EXAMPLE (for presenta- 
tion at the 84th Annual Meeting & Exhibition, Vancouver, British Columbia, 
June 16 - 21,1991). 
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C. Pollution Substitution 
A concern relating particularly to carbon taxes is that 
taxing fossil fuel emissions without taxing nuclear power en- 
vironmental risks will unfairly advantage nuclear power and 
thus promote increases in nuclear risks.ll It is for this rea- 
son that the European Cornunity is proposing to combine 
carbon taxes with broader taxes on energy. A better solution 
would be to  also tax nuclear fuel processing and nuclear 
waste. 
D. Spiking 
A concern pertaining to taxes on pollution that is local in 
nature is the spiking problem. Spiking is the notion that pol- 
lution damage is a function not just of what is being added to  
the environment but also of pollution already present from 
existing sources. The effects of cumulative pollution may 
vary sharply from place to place within a jurisdiction.12 The 
taxes need to be adjusted, where appropriate, to take account 
of these differences. Since carbon dioxide emissions affect 
global environmental problems, however, this spiking prob- 
lem would not be applicable to a carbon tax. 
E. Revenue Erosion 
Another problem with all pollution taxes where the reve- 
nues are important is that, to the extent the tax is successful 
in reducing pollution, the tax base is eroded. Funds from tax 
proceeds sought to  provide general revenues, clean up the en- 
vironment, help with sectoral and equity impact alleviation, 
or support offsets from other taxes will be eroded.13 The solu- 
tion is to phase in a gradually increasing tax over time, or at  
least over the relevant planning horizon. Eventually, as opti- 
mal carbon tax levels are achieved, other tax options, prefera- 
bly taxes on other pollutants, will have to be substituted. 
11. STONE, supra note 9. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
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F. Point of Imposition 
At what point to impose the taxes is another important 
issue. Administrative ease and enforcement considerations 
dictate that the taxes be imposed as far upstream as possible. 
Upstream taxes are a blunt instrument, however, failing to  
account for pollution control measures that may occur further 
downstream.14 Therefore, where emissions can be readily 
measured and monitored, it is far better to tax the actual 
downstream emissions. 
G. Avoidance 
Another problem that must be addressed is the problem 
of avoidance and enforcement. The higher the tax, the 
greater the incentive is to avoid it by moving business activi- 
ties across the border or by illegal imports firom other juris- 
dictions or from Native American nations in the United 
States. Particularly problems occur with taxes on petroleum 
distribution which is a very thin-margin business where a 
few cents per gallon can be a large difference. As the differ- 
ence between taxed and untaxed product grows, so does the 
incentive for evasion. 
Great difficulty is experienced now with fuel tax evasion. 
Additional enforcement measures should be part of any pack- 
age, particularly one that increases state-level petroleum tax- 
ation. Also, state-federal cooperation in assuring compliance 
with gasoline taxes has been effective and should be pursued 
in enforcement of state pollution taxes. 
H. Exemptions 
There will also be pressures for exemptions - for farm- 
ers, governments and non-profit organizations - that need 
to be considered. besent federal and state taxes on: energy 
are rife with such exemptions.15 Exemptions should not be 
considered, however, particularly for downstream pollution 
14. For example, the use of scrubbers or %lean coal" technologies. 
15. See, e.g., I.R.C. 5 6427 (1994). 
Heinonline - -  1 2  Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 1 0 9  1 9 9 4 - 1 9 9 5  
110 PACE ENYIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW Wol. 12 
taxes, since exemptions there would seriously erode the envi- 
ronmental effects desired. 
I. False Perception of Solution 
Lastly, adoption of a pollution tax may give the false im- 
pression that the pollution problems subject to the tax have 
been resolved. Rarely, however, will a tax alone be sufficient 
for bringing pollution within acceptable limits. The tax is 
useful as an incentive to  speed compliance with regulations, 
as with the United States-adopted CFC tax, and to go beyond 
the standards set by regulation, encouraging adoption of new 
technologies. This should be clearly stated at the time of 
adoption of a pollution tax. 
111. Carbon Tax Considerations 
Of particular recent interest has been consideration of 
carbon taxes as a means of meeting the international goals 
for stabilizing global climate change. This was proposed at 
the United Nations Conference of Environment and Develop- 
ment (UNCED).16 Individual countries were given the re- 
sponsibility to develop their own strategies for meeting goals 
the Climate Change Convention adopted.l7 The European 
Community has under consideration a carbon tax and a 
number of European countries have already adopted carbon 
taxes on their own as means of meeting these Convention 
targets. 
The overwhelming majority of carbon dioxide releases 
come fkom combustion of fossil fuels at utilities, in industrial 
processes and in motor vehicles. Carbon taxes can take a va- 
riety of forms, largely dependent on the point at which the 
tax is imposed. In each case, the objective is to  create the 
maximum reduction of carbon dioxide emitted with maxi- 
mum economic efficiency. The tax can be imposed at any 
16. This conference was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 1992. The con- 
vention worked as an international forum to form future agreements and trea- 
ties that affect the environment, development and resources of the Earth. 
17. G.A. Res. 451212, UNCED, 5th Sess. U.N. Doc. MAC. 237118 (Part 11) 
(1992) reprinted in AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED PROCEEDINGS 1685 - 1713 
(Nicholas A. Robinson ed. 1992). 
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point between the extraction of carbon-rich fuel sources as a 
p rog  for carbon dioxide emissions, to the emissions 
themselves. 
For a state carbon tax, on the surface it would appear 
easiest fkom an administrative and enforcement standpoint 
to  impose the tax "upstream" at the mine mouth for coal or 
the well-head for oil or natural gas. However, there are sev- 
eral problems with this upstream taxation. It gives no credit 
for controls or improved combustion processes that may be 
added downstream to reduce carbon emissions. It gives no 
incentives to develop technologies for carbon dioxide emission 
reductions and it imposes administrative difficulties for treat- 
ment of high-carbon fuels imported into a state. States can 
impose taxes on imported goods, under the Commerce Clause 
of the United States Constitution,l8 so long as the taxes are 
non-discriminatory, the same for imported fuels as for domes- 
tically produced fuels. 
States could also impose a "midstream" tax on the carbon 
content of imported fuels at their point of entry into the state, 
whether by truck, tanker, rail or pipeline19 or at  the utility or 
fuel distribution center to which the fuels are delivered. Tax- 
ation at the point of delivery also gives no credit for more effi- 
cient combustion processes or for other emission reduction 
technologies, but is probably easiest administratively. 
Finally, the tax could be imposed on the emissions them- 
selves at the point of use. This might be relatively easy for 
utilities and large industrial facilities where the emissions 
can be readily measured and monitored, but virtually impos- 
sible to administer relative to each commercial or residential 
fuel combustion or with respect to motor vehicles. To the ex- 
tent that actual emissions can be measured and monitored, 
however, taxation downstream of the emissions is the best 
option environmentally and fkom the standpoint of economic 
efficiency, since technological improvements can be fully 
taken into account. 
18. U.S.Co~s~.art .I ,$8,d.3.  
19. This could be feasible but administratively even more burdensome. 
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In the United States, a national carbon tax was consid- 
ered by the Clinton Administration as one of the instruments 
for alleviating our budget deficit. The tax was rejected by the 
Administration on the basis of the anticipated political diffi- 
culties flowing from its large impacts on coal-producing 
states, particularly since the head of the Senate Appropria- 
tions Committee was from West Virginia. The Administra- 
tion instead opted for a Btu tax which it subsequently had to 
abandon because of the political resistance from affected 
interests. 
Based on this experience, it is unlikely that energy taxes 
or energy-related pollution taxes will again be visited at the 
federal level for the foreseeable future. Therefore, it is timely 
for states to consider pioneering in adoption of taxes on car- 
bon and other pollutants. 
IV. Why State Pollution Taxes? 
State taxes on income, capital, payrolls, sales and prop- 
erty impose particularly great burdens on state economies. 
They act not only to burden state businesses and residents, 
discouraging them from investing and working, but they also 
drive investment interests and workers from the state. Re- 
cent studies show that the competitive disadvantages to a 
state of these traditional taxes are very great.20 
The logic of substituting pollution taxes for traditional 
state taxes is particularly great since improving the local en- 
vironment not only have positive health and environmen- 
tal effects for existing state residents, but it will also make 
the state more of an attracti~n for business investment and 
labor immigration. Thus, substitution of environmental 
charges can raise revenues while improving environmental 
quality and reducing taxes that drive businesses and workers 
away from the state. 
20. REPEXTO ET AL., supra note 1 at 4-6 (citing Timothy J. Bartik, Business 
Location Decisions in the United States: Estimates of the Effects of Unioniza- 
tion, Taxes, and Other Characteristics of States, 3(1) J .  BUS. & ECON. STAT., 14, 
14-22 (1985). 
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A tax switch to pollution taxes should also be politically 
attractive. Making polluters pay for the damages they im- 
pose on society should be much more palatable than taxing 
people's income, capital, payrolls, sales and property. Indeed, 
the public seems to accept only taxes specifically tied to bene- 
fits, like the social security tax even though it is highly re- 
gressive. Emphasis should be placed on the reduction of their 
traditional tax bills and the opportunity to mitigate pollution 
taxes by reducing pollution-causing activity. 
At present, the only way most people can reduce their tax 
bill is to work less and earn less income. The American 
public is overwhelmingly in favor of environmental protec- 
tion. If environmental charges were in place, they could 
instead reduce their tax bills by, for instance, saving en- 
ergy, bicycling to work, or recycling.21 
States have traditionally been a crucible for experimen- 
tation with new concepts, proving their practicality and thus 
paving the way for federal legislation, particularly in the en- 
vironmental field. California pioneered in setting appliance 
efficiency standards which were later adopted by Congress. 
California is now playing a similar role with respect to non- 
polluting vehicles. Adoption of state carbon and other pollu- 
tion taxes could demonstrate their feasibility and pave the 
way for future federal action. 
State carbon taxes have been resisted as being inconse- 
quential in addressing global problems of climate change. 
This is not true, however. Consider the following: "Only six 
foreign nations release more C02 than Texas. Texas green- 
house emissions exceed those of Canada, Poland or Italy and 
Argentina combined. California contributes more to global 
warming than Spain, South Korea or South Afkica.*22 As 
demonstrated Table 1, New York contributes more pollution 
than three quarters of the nations of the world including 
21. Id. at 12. 
22. F. Muller & J.A. Hoerner, The Promise of State Carbon Taxes: Opportu- 
nities and Policy Issues, STATE TAX NOTES 530 (1993). 
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Belgium, Yugoslavia, Nigeria, Greece, Iraq, Iran, Switzer- 
land, Israel and all the Scandinavian countries together. 
Adoption of a carbon tax at the state level, therefore, can 
have meaninghl impact on the global warming threat in and 
of itself, and even more so as an example which other states 
and the federal government can follow. If each state and 
country adopts an attitude that its small contribution to  the 
global problem is too insigniscant to matter, nothing will ever 
get done to  address the problem. 
A number of states have already acted on various non- 
tax measures to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases. 
Vermont has developed a comprehensive plan to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and non-renewable energy con- 
sumption per capita as a result of a 1989 gubernatorial di- 
rective. In 1992, the Connecticut legislature directed that 
the state energy plan include a C02 emissions reduction 
level . . . New York, Massachusetts, California, and Ne- 
vada [and recently Wisconsin] have all assigned explicit 
monetary costs to COz emissions for purposes of doing 
least-cost planning. A host of other initiatives are in place 
in other states.23 
Table 1 
23. Id. at 530 n. 5 (stating for a review of state initiatives on global warm- 
ing, see P. WEXLER, CENTER FOR GLOBAL CHANGE REPORT, COOL TOOLS: STATE 
AND LOCAL POLICY OPTIONS TO CONFRONT A CHANGING CLIMATE (1992); AN- 
DREW SILBERGER & RON GRAVIS, THE BRUCE COMPANY, SELECTED SUMMARY OF 
CURRENT STATE RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE (July 1992)). 
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Table 1 (continued) 
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Table 1 (continued) 
V. Getting States to Consider and Pass Pollution 
Taxes 
State and local governments already impose a wide vari- 
ety of taxes on energy consumption, including taxes on gaso- 
line, diesel fuel, utilities and Btu, as well as a potpourri of 
related taxes such as severance taxes. The problem with en- 
ergy taxes is that they may fall equally on clean and dirty 
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fuels. Being narrowly imposed on energy, they require a 
higher level of tax to achieve the same revenue and pollution 
reduction than a broader based carbon tax. Carbon taxes are 
broadly distributed over residential, commercial and indus- 
trial taxpayers and an appropriate share is born by interstate 
commerce and tourism.24 Energy taxes also are likely to en- 
counter more political resistance than pollution taxes which 
can be supported on the basis of making polluters pay for the 
environmental costs they impose on society. 
Carbon taxes do not have to have large economic effects. 
A modest ten dollars per ton state carbon tax would impose a 
very low economic burden. Even with a utility which has a 
fuel mix of ninety percent coal, the price increase would only 
be 2.8 mills per kwh, or less than a gross receipts tax of five 
percent which is well within the range of existing state en- 
ergy taxes. For most utilities, with lower proportions of coal 
in their fuel mix, the effects on prices would be considerably 
less. Furthermore, if the response to a carbon tax is to in- 
crease energy efficiency, the savings may more than offset the 
tax.25 
Legislation for small state carbon taxes was introduced 
in Maryland in 1992, in Minnesota in 1990 and in California 
last year. While none of these bills were adopted, the Mary- 
land proposal was the subject of legislative hearings26 and 
the bill was dropped only in a last minute settlement by the 
houses of the legislature.27 
There is a tremendous aversion to taxes in the United 
States today. The failure of the very modest federal Btu tax 
which was proposed by the Clinton Administration to help 
balance the budget demonstrates this aversion to taxes. Re- 
cent state elections also demonstrate this aversion, most no- 
tably the New Jersey gubernatorial election, which hinged in 
large part on voter aversion to taxation. 
24. Id. at 531-32. 
25. Id. at 534. 
26. Small State Carbon Taxes: Hearings on 5.665 Before the Subcommittee 
on Budget and Taxution of the Maryland Senate Comm. (1992). 
27. F. Muller & J.A. Hoerner, supra note 22 at 541-44. 
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It may be, therefore, that the only way to  get pollution 
taxes introduced initially will be on a revenue-neutral basis, 
shifting tax burdens &om income and capital to polluting ac- 
tivities. This should be very attractive politically, particu- 
larly in light of a study published by EPA researchers 
demonstrating that a shift from federal taxes on capital and 
business income to a federal carbon tax could produce a sig- 
nificant national economic stimulus because of the greater 
economic efficiency of a carbon tax.28 If this phenomenon can 
be demonstrated at the state level, pollution taxes, properly 
presented, could be very saleable. 
Revenue-neutral pollution taxes could encompass offsets 
to alleviate the economic burden to the state from the taxes, 
the sectoral impacts on energy-intensive industries particu- 
larly affected and the equity impacts on low income people. 
Consideration should also be given to using some of the tax 
revenues for pollution reduction.29 It might be possible to 
garner support from utilities for the tax exchange if utility 
gross receipts taxes, particularly anathema to  the utilities, 
were reduced and if the pollution taxes were to replace use of 
externality values in resource selection. 
States today are very concerned about avoiding economic 
hardship from loss of business to other states and about pro- 
moting economic development within their borders. Many 
states, like New York, import most of their fuels today, so a 
carbon tax or other taxes on air pollution would have the ef- 
fect of discouraging these fuel imports and substituting in- 
state spending on energy efficiency, thus discouraging the ex- 
port of jobs and encouraging in-state employment. It should 
be possible to demonstrate that there will be a net economic 
stimulus to  the state from shifting to  pollution taxes. 
Of course, all taxes burden the taxpayers affected and 
there would be negative sectoral impacts of a carbon tax, par- 
ticularly on energy-intensive industries and on the producers 
of fossil fuels, the combustion of which produces high carbon 
- 
28. Robert Shackleton et. al, The Efficiency Value of Carbon Tax Revenues 
(Mar. 27,1992) (unpublished drafk manuscript, on file with the Pace University 
School of Law Energy Project, Center for Environmental Legal Services). 
29. Ajay K Sanghi & Anthony L. Joseph, supra note 10. 
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dioxide emissions. Consumption taxes are also likely to  affect 
a higher proportion of income of poor people. Some of the rev- 
enues of the taxes should, therefore, be used to alleviate these 
sectoral and equity effects. 
The best way to  promote adoption of a state tax shift 
f2om business and income taxes to a carbon tax and other pol- 
lution taxes is to  perform a highly credible study to  determine 
the economic impacts of the taxes on the state's economy and 
the industrial sectors within the state. The study should 
also determine the impact on low income residents, and the 
ability of the offsets to alleviate these pollution tax impacts. 
The Pace University Center for Environmental Legal 
Studies and Tellus Institute have proposed such a study for 
' New York. We chose to study a state carbon tax. The study 
also concentrates on a variety of uses of the revenues &om 
these taxes to address gross economic impacts and sectoral 
and equity effects, to reduce pollution and to derive state 
revenues. 
We are hopeful that, armed with a study which shows 
significant net state benefits from such a tax exchange, we 
can persuade the New York Governor and Legislature to be- 
come the first state to adopt a carbon tax and a pioneer in 
promoting taxes on pollution. 
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